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The Foreign Policy of the United States
Mike Mansfield (D) Montana
Let me begin by pointing out that foreign policy is not a formula out
of the laboratory of an alchemist.

It is not a potion which is guaranteed

to cure the ills of the nation and the world's ills in a single dose.

There

is nothing supernatural about foreign policy and none of us need to stand in
awe of it.

Foreign policy is made by human beings for human situations.

\-/hat

all of us need is to learn more about it--its problem3, its possibilities and
its limitations--because it has a very profound effect upon our lives.

The

more we know about it, the more we can do to bring it under rational democratic
control.
Our foreign policy is simply the course of action

whic~

we take to

safeguard the nation and guide its progress in a very imperfect and highly
dangerous world.

Because of the nature of the postwar world, the course we

have taken since 1945 has involved a use of our resources on a greater scale
than ever before in peacetime to influence developments in other parts of
the world.
waste.

The use of a prudent part of our resources in this fashion is not

It is not a callous disregard of our domestic needs in the interest

of foreign powers .
of

E,l~

It is a sound investment in the security and well-being

generation of Americans and the generations that will follow us.

If

we do not make this investment, the possibilities are multiplied that we shall
waste resources many times greater in a third general 1-1ar at some not too
distant date.
There are two ways to live in freedom in an insecure world,

One is to

meet, every day, a segment of the international responsibilities that freedom

I

[

entails, to make them a regular lJart of our lives.

The other is to ignore

these responsibilities until a new tyranny has set the world aflame, and,
then, drop everything in a last minute effort to keep the fire from reaching
our homes.

- 2 Under the leadership of the President, we have been trying to follow
the first way.

We have used and are using such resources--economic, technical,

cultural and military--as we can spare, as a form of insurance to promote the
cause of peace, freedom and progress, and to minimize, thereby, the possibility
of the rise of aggressive tyranny to the point where it might be in a position
to strike for world domination.
The resources which we have available for this international purpose
are not unlimited. · We can afford to use them only where there is reasonable
expectation that they will accomplish the objective for which they are intended.
In general, this will be in situations where the peoples and governments most
directly involved are alive to the meaning and obligations of freedom and will
shoulder these obligations if given a helping hand.
Whatever policy we pursue to-vrards other nations, all of us --directly or
indirectly--share responsibility for it.
possible course.

All of us gain, if it is the best

All of us, as well as generations yet to come, will suffer

very real losses if it is not.
You will note that I said the best possible course.

In the life of each

of us, there is usually a considerable gap between our hopes and our

accomplishments, between the ideal and the actuality.
in foreign policy.

The same thing is true

The world we live in is inhabited by men, not Gods, and

the international situations .i n which we find ourselves usually reflect all
of the shortcomings and imperfections to which mankind is heir.
In some instances, our foreign policy will follow a particular course
to meet a given set of

circu~tances,

In the light of all these circumstances

it will seem like the best possible course and ferr, if any of us, will
criticize it or raise any questions about it .

Then, three or four years

later, some who have an oversupply of the wisdom of hindsight and a special

- 3 aptitude for Honday-morning quarterbacking, will suddenly discover that the
course that we took three or four years before was all wrong .

Naturally, to

exercise this kind of wisdom, one has to have a very short memory and a Helldeveloped ability to transplant.

One has to be able to forget all the circum-

stances that existed at the time the course was originally set, and to
transplant that course into the circumstances that exist today .
All of us have some of this kind of wisdom.

It is the kind of wisdom

that makes us say to ourselves or our friends "if I had only bought a hundred
head of cattle back in 1940, I would be in fine shape today because the price
of beef is high in 1951."

When we indulge our fancy in this way, of course,

we have to forget that back in 1940 we didn't have the price of a hundred head
of cattle; or if we had, we would not have been able to buy a ranch to graze
them on.

A little of this wisdom doesn 't do us any damage .

pastime when practiced by individuals.

It is a harmless

vle t hinl<: about "what might have been"

for a few moments and then go about the very real business of living in the
present.

But in connection with foreign policy, i f we keep at this .Monday

morning quarterback:i.ng day in and day out, month in and month out, year in
and year out, it occupies so much of our time and energy as a nation that we
have very little left of either to deal 1·rith the pressing situations of the
day.

And some Americans are doing exactly that.

The result is that the

attention of all of us is deflected from the pressing
international life.

probler~

of current

If you have felt confused about foreign policy, and who

among us hasn't, you can exple.in much of that confusion by the constant hara ngue
to which vre are subjected to look backward, instead of around. us and fo:nrard.
It is a harangue that originates in the same kind of mentality that told us
to look back at the "good old days" when we were trying to fight our vray out
of the depression in the thirties.
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n~tion

and the world i f only we hadn't tried, during the war, to get along with the
Russians; if only President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hadn't
signed the Teheran and Yalta Agreements, and President Truman the Potsdam
Agreement.

Hhat these Ivlonday-morning q_uarterbacks conveniently forget, of

course, is that if we hadn't been fighting with some allies on our side in
World vJar II we might still be locked in combat with Germany and Japan or have
We might have had casualties of 5 million

been destroyed by those countries.

or 10 million or 25 million instead of the million or more th~we s~ffered.
What the Monday morning q_uarterbacks forget is that we got along with Russia
and made those agree1nents at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in order to shorten
Horld vTar II and to make an attempt at establishing a basis f or an enduring
peace.

vlho runong us; at the time, objected to these purposes?

circumstances have changed since

Of course

1945. Of course some of the decisions taken

at these conferences are inapplicable in the present situation.

This does

'

not mean that the agreements at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam w·ere the work of
scoundrels or incompetents.

Least of all does it mean that if these

agreements had never been made the nation would be better off.
known only when the events of this

cent~·y--all

That will be

the events--are viewed in

t~e

perspective of history.
But Teheran, Yalta and

P otsda~

belong to a past era--the era of the

of fascist totalitarianism and its defeat.

r~ se

Today, the primary threat to our

nation, to peace, and to democratic progress sterns from a new totalitarianism
which has its core in Soviet imperialism.

President Roosevelt at Yalta and

President Truman at Potsdam both tried to prevent a

developn~nt

of this kind.

Both sought, at the end of the greatest war, to put a stop to further wars and
the threat of rTars.

They tried to avoid a split runong the victors and to

- 5 bring together all of the nations of the world into the forward surge of
mankind.

Isn't that what all of us wanted in 1945?

attempt?

I think that the ideal •ras well worth striving for and I think I·Te

Was it wrong to make this

should continue to strive for it.
Events since 1945, however, have clearly shmm that the ideal of a world
without the threat of war remains, as it long has been; one of the most
elusive dreams of mankind.

As a nation, we cannot lose ourselves in dreams cf

the future, just as we cannot take refuge in the "might-have-beens" of the pc.L·c .
We must continue to live with the realities of the present.
And the most significant of these realities is the>.t there is once again
loose in the 1vorld a nation bent upon 1vorld domination.

To meet this new

situation, the course of our foreign policy is being adjusted as rapidly as
those who wring their hands over the past or who are lost in the future will
permit.
By the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the aims of the Soviet Union
had become quite clear.

While this country had disarmed hastily, the Russians

had continued to lceep an enormous mass of soldiers in a state of readiness, ar_d
had embarked upon a program of ruthless expansion.

They had not only compro -·

mised the independence of countries along their frontier, but

internationa~ .

communism was eating its vay into Western Europe via the roads of economis
misery) social discontent and political instability.

Greece and Turkey

wer ~

under relentless cornnunist pressure.
It does not take an expert in foreign affairs to s ee lvhat a collapse in
Western Europe and the Middle East at that time would have meant to the
security of this nation and to the world.
The United States plus Western Etrrope plus their associated countries now
have an annual production of steel and pig iron more than four times that of

- 6 the Soviet world; they produce three times as much coal o.nd ten times as much
petroleum.

Move the resources of Western Europe and the associated countries

to the Soviet side and the comparisons change drastically.
But beyond the naked fact of the balance of power, the nations which vere
about to collapse in late 1947 were the birthplace and cradle of \-!estern civilization.

The institutions under which we live, the hopes we cherish, the

origins of most of our citizens, were rooted in those countries.
have contributed in some fashion to life as we know it.
stability they
civilization.

co~ld

All of then

With a return to

be expected to continue t o contribute to the advance of

~e

He we, then, to abandon them, in 1947, to a new barbarism?

We met this threat to the Western World vith great unity of purpose.
On Barch 12, 1947, the President proposed to Congress that the United States
extend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey.

Under the leadership

of a great Republican Senator; the late Arthur Vandenberg, Congress passed the
necessary legislation by an overwhelming bi-partisan vote.

This measure--the

Truman Doctrine--was the real beginning of our struggle to guard the nation
against the new tyranny looming on the horizon.

From this doctrine has sprung

the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program, economic and military assistance to countries in the Far and Near East
and other si@1ificant actions of foreign policy.

These ore the programs vhich

have so far prevented the Soviet Union from striking for world domination and
precipitating a general war.

They have had, until recently, wide bi--partisan

support.
I need not review all the details of these programs, but I should like t o
survey briefly some of the progress which has been illade in carrying them out.
Just this month> at General Eisenhovrer 's :r:eque st, I had occasion to visit
Europe and to observe this progress first-hand.

- 7 As of the first months of 1951 the basic aims of the Marshall Plan had
been largely, although not completely, achieved.

The communists in Western

Europe had made every effort to sabotage the project, and they had failed.
(

Industrial output had risen almost 40 percent above the level of 1938; trade
and exchange difficulties had lessened considerably; and there were good
Frospects for continuing economic improvement.
The threat of political collapse, so acute in

19~·7,

has been averted.

Discontent, by no means, has disappeared--as the results of the recent elect:· •.c::
in Italy show--but the gloom of defeatism that hung over the region has liftecL .
Europeans dare to believe again in a future of freedom.
To protect these gains in Western Europe, a f ar-reaching security system
has been established.
this system.

The United Nations charter has provided the basis for

It exFlicitly recognizes the inherent and fundamental right of

member states to defend themselves collectively against attack and provides
for the formation of regional security arrangements.

Under these provisions

we had, in September 1947, already joined with the Latin American countries in
establishing a system of mutual defense for the Western Hemisphere.

After the

passage of the Vandenberg Resolution by the Senate in June 1948, with its
obvious reference to the North Atlantic Co1nmunity, this country began to work
out a plan of mutual defense with the Western European nations.

On April

4,

1949, twelve nations --the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France , Italy,
Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Portugal-signed the North Atlantic Treaty.
The purpose of thi s treaty is strictly defensive.
nation except a would-be aggressor.

It threatens no

It operates primarily as a deterrent,

serving formal notice that an attack upon any part of the Atlantic Community
1-rill be met vi th the united resistance of the whole.

If the Russians ever

- 8 nourished the expectation that the ripened plum of a recovered Europe could be
plucked with impunity, they now know differently.
The organization to carry out the obligations of this treaty is already
in operation.

Most of the military commanders have been appointed and the

strategic plans are being placed in readiness.

Under the Mutual Defense

Assistance Act, we are trying to fill what General Eisenhower called "the great,
the crying need (for) the impedimenta. of armies, of nc>.vies, of air forces."
The sudden outbreak of the Korean aggression compelled the Free World to
revise its estbnate of Soviet intentions.

We have speeded up the delivery of

military supplies to Europe and increased our commitments in this respect.

A

decision has been made to include vlestern German camtributions to the defense
pool and consideration is being given to adding others from Spain.
In a further effort to bolster Western defenses and to fortify the morals
of the He stern Europeans who dread an occupation by Red troops, even though the
Soviet Union might eventually be defeated, the United States recently decided
to send four Army divisions to Western Germany in addition to the two already
there.

There was considerable opposition to this step in some quarters for

several reasons, prominent among H'hich vras a fear that large American f orces
might be drawn into a land war against the vast populations commanded by the
Soviet Union.

Secretary of Defense Marshall, however, has made clear that the

plan is for the Western Europeans to supply the bulk of the land armies needed
for their defense .
That Soviet aggression can be deterred has been demonstrated over and over
again .

The record which has been a chieved during the past f ive years has come

from follovring a course of no appeasement, cooperation with free nations and
devotion t o peace.

We have negotiated with the Russians--as in the c ase of

Berlin- -but we have not appeased.

We have yielded to the vrishes of our all ies

- 9 on some issues and they have yielded to ours on others.

Here at home we have

refUsed to retreat into a new isolationism and, at the same time, we have held
in check those who think that a bomb dropped on Moscow will not only begin a

war but end it.
What is the record of the past five years in brief?

The Soviet Union has

not dared to precipitate a general war; Yugoslavia has broken loose from the
Moscow chains; Greece--the gateway to the Middle East--has been saved from
destruction.

Efforts of the cormnunists to capture He stern Europe by capital-

izing on economic misery and social unrest have been thwarted by the European
Recovery Plan.

The menace of communist armed aggression has been counteracted

by the North Atlantic defense program,

The Berlin airlift was a dramatic demon-

stration of the manner in which western determination and technical ability can
create a situation in which bonafide negotiations with the Russians became
possible .
The record of our foreign policy in Europe is a record of accomplishment,
written in spite of the dire predictions of a fevr in our midst who continue to
ignore the responsibilities of the hour while they read and re-read the Teheran,
Yalta, and Potsdam agreements.
Or if it is not these agreements, then it is the Far East that occupies
them practically to the exclusion of the rest of the world.

It is as though the

sun of international events not only rises in the East but also sets in the East .
This i s the region that has given rise to most of the conflict over our
foreign policy.

The typhoon now raging about Capital Hill in Washington

originated in the vicinity of Formosa .

Typhoon is one of the few words in the

English language that is derived from the Chinese.

It is taken from two Chinese

characters -- "die" and "fung" which, together, mean "big wind . "

It is quite a

typhoon - - this controversy over Far Eastern policy - - and, like most of the
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storms that blow out of the China Sea, it is full of sound and fury.
This sound and fury, unfortunately, conceals a wide belt of calm -- un area
of substantial agreement upon which a stable Far Eastern policy can be conducted.
There is, for example, practically no disagreement among responsible persons in
the Government as to the fundamental facts of the Asian situation today.

The

Administration and qualified Members of Congress have long recognized them and
General MacArthur, in his farewell address to both Houses, reviewed them.
In Asia, today, 1ve are face-to-face with a transition of continental
proportions.

Events of the past few years have stirred half the population of

the earth--more than a billion human beings--into a state of restless agitation.
These people differ widely in race, culture and outlook.
however, their lot has been the same.

In some ways,

Over the centuries, most of them

acquiesced in the rule of native tyrants or the control of foreigners.

Most of

them endured--seemingly without complaint--a life of ignorance, disease and
incredible poverty.

Billions were born, lived out a brief life span -- usually

under 30 years -- and died.
flood or epidemic.

Millions were swept away in a stroke, by famine,

These catastrophes were quickly forgotten in the struggle

of the living to survive.

Life went on -- compelling and unchanging.

This

was the "changeless East."
But beneath the surface serenity of resignation, a ferment of discontent
has been churning for decades, building up great pressures for social and
political change.

From time to time, there were varning signs, as for example,

the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the rioting and insurrections throughout
Southern and Southeast Asia between the two wars.
Then came World War II and the surface calm gave way once nnd for all
under its powerful impetus .

Vast forces were released.

From Korea to

- ll Pakistan, from Mongolia to the Philippines -- tidal waves of unrest rolled
over this innnense area.

Millions of people were caught up in the cross-currents,

propelled by two fundamental drives -- a common determination to end foreign
domination and to do something about the crushing poverty ,.rhich, for centuries,
had produced the cycle of birth, miserable life and early death.
The transition which is taking place in the Far East is not a gentle one .
In many places, it already has engendered violence on a scale unprecedented in
recent history.

11illions have died as a direct or indirect result of the civil

conflicts in China and Southeast Asia and in the religious strife that raarked
the partition of the Indian subcontinent.
and are on the move .

Hillions more have been uprooted

They are seeking new roOts to sustain life and to give it

meaning and direction.
These, then, are the facts of the Far East of 1951.
in transition, and often, in violent transition.

Half the world is

This transition holds

tremendous possibilities for good but it also carries the seeds of a potentially
enormous evil.
If the nevr nations of the Far East can maintain their independence and the
new governments can deal effectively with the accumulated problems of their
people, there is every reason to believe that they will make a profound contribution to their own development, to the cause of peace and to the general
advancement of mankind.

If, on the other hand, they fall victims to a new

imperialism -- whether it be of the type recently advanced by Japan or the more
subtle type now emanating from the Soviet Union -- if this should occur, then
the rest of the world, and we as a part of it, would be exposed to a grave danger.
There is u real prospect of this happening because in the confusion and
frustrations of the hour, men often turn to the easy way out, the quick and
unreasoned solution to their difficulties.

Communism or other reactionary
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movements, based on such slogans as "Asia for the Asians" offer very real
enticements, however delusive, to the hungry and discontented.
Some may wish that the facts in the Far East were otherwise,

Some may

long for the old days of the "changeless East" and its "unspoiled charm," but
these cannot be recalled.
The fact is that we must conduct Far Eastern pplicy within the framework
of a "changing East" -- a rapidly, erratically and, frequently, violently
"changing East."

To imagine that the situation is otherwise ''ill lead us to

build a policy on sands of unreality and to court, thereby, its repeated
collapses.
But recognition of the facts of the situation in Asia is only one
prerequisite to sound policy.

For the Far East is only a part of the larger

framework of foreign policy which is the globe itself.

And Far Eastern policy,

if it is to serve the nation, must be viewed in that total perspective.
cannot concentrate our attention exclusively on Asia.

\le

To do so, is to ignore

regions which, at this moment in history, are at least as vital.
In the Far East we can bring to bear a prudent part of the resources
which we have available for international purposes in an effort to influence
developments in the direction of peace, freedom and progress,

VJe cannot deploy

all our resources to that area without leaving others, such as Europe and the
Middle East, dangerously exposed.
There are some situations in the Far East with vrhich, by working constructively with others, we can deal effectively.
act, and vre are acting.

In these situations we should

But under no circumstances ought we to assume unilat-

eral responsibility for everything that happens in Asia or for the future of
that vast continent.

Under no circumstances should we overcommit ourselves,

even in the name of an anti-communist crusade.

Korea is not the only country

- 13 in the world that lives in the shadow of communist imperialism.

Communism,

itself, is not the first form of tyranny that has threatened the world, nor is
it, necessarily, the last.

The way to a world of freedc ..1 and international

decency is long and difficult and we will do well to draw judiciously upon our
strength as we move along it.
In general, that is what we have done in the Far East and that is what
we are doing now.

Mistakes have been made and others may be expected.

policy is made by human beings and human beings make mistakes.

Foreign

As I have

already pointed out, all of us contribute directly or indirectly to our foreign
policy and we share responsibility for its success or failure.
I think, however, that we need not be ashamed of the course we have
pursued in the Far East for five years.

/.

When it is viewed in its entirely,

within the framework of the facts of Asia and the larger framework of the
global situation -- the record is good.

I go further and suggest that beneath

the sound and fury of the present controversy, it will be found that

li~ st

persons

in this country -- regardless of party -- generally have supported and will
continue to support that policy.
Let us examine this thesis against the record of our activity in the Far
East since

19!~5.

In the Philippines we fulfilled promptly our long-standing pledge to grant
independence to the islands.

We kept our wartime promise t o aid in recon-

struction, providing f or this purpose technical assistance, hundreds of millions
of doll2rs of direct compensation to those who suffered losses, and surplus
property of enormous value at a negligible price.

In 1946, we also worked out

mutual defense arrangements that are designed to safeguard the Philippines from
a repetition of invasion as well as to enhance our own se curity.
As far as I can determine, there has been no serious opposition to any of

- 14 these measures in Congress or out of Congress.
support.

They have had wide bipartisan

It is not over the Philippine policy, then, that the present contro -

versy rages.
But in spite of our efforts and those of many conscientious Filipinos,
the islands have not made the progress which might have been expected.
Last year there were alarming reports that the Philippines might go the
way of China.

The reasons advanced were much the same

corruption in

government, unfair economic advantage to a favored few at the expense of the
many, and the growth in strength of a communist-led revolutionary group in the
countryside .
What could 1-re have done in these circumstances?

Reverse the independence

granted a fevr short years ago and reoccupy the islands?

To illustrate the

difficulty in such a course, I might point out that when ve requested permission
to post Marines as guards at our embassy in .Manila because of the tense
situation, the Philippine government hotly rejected the request as an affront
to its sovereignty.

But even if the course of reoccupation were feasible, the

direct control of the Philippines would require an enormous allocation of our
economic and military resources.

v!hat would be left for other areas?

Are

the American people willing to assume an increased tax burden and new casualty
lists for this purpose?
A second alternative vould be to abandon the islands to their fate and
risk their falling into unfriendly hands .

One consideration

are others -- indicates how dangerous this course would be.
as vital to the security of the Pacific.

and there
We regard Formosa

Hov much more so are the Philippines!

Confronted with a set of facts of this kind, our Philippine policy has
taken the only direction that is practical.

We have not assumed primary

responsibility f or the political administration, the internal security or the

- 15 domestic economy of the Philippines.

The Filipino people were demanding, in

effect, the right to deal with these problems themselves when they sought
independence.

We conceded them that right when we set them free,

These

problems, properly, are the primary responsibility of the Filipinos.
necessarily, is that of
with the islands.

R

Our role,

neighbor who has had a long and close relationship

In this role, 1ve have increased our military assistance and

our technical aid to help them meet the present abnormal situation.

The

President has sone a step further and has called upon the Philippine government
to undertake certain basic reforms as a condition for additional econon1ic help.
The Filipinos have given evidence of a willingness to make the necessary
improvements and Congress is now considering a measure which will provide that
help.
We cannot be certain that this policy will succeed.

There is no

assurance that as a result of it..) the Philippines will emerge a s a progressive
and stable member of the Free World.
policy, there are rarely certainties,

In the planning and execution of foreie;n
The most that we can hope for is that we

have chosen the best possible course of action in the light of a given set of
circumstances.

Many people have compla ined about the situation in the

Philippi nes but no one, so far as I am aware, ha s offered a policy approach
differing basically from the three I have suggested here.
get out, or help out .

That is -- get in,

The way we have chosen is neither the way of imperialism

which is to get in, nor the way of isolationism which is to get out.

It is the

American way, rrhich is to help out,
I have dwelt at length on the Philippines for it illustrates the complex
problems which confront our policy- makers elsewhere in the Far East.
southern

~nd

In

southeast Asia we have also sought to deal with the facts of the

situation in the same way -- neither by getting in nor getting out, but by

- 16 helping out.

We have cooperated with many friendly nations in this region.

In the case of Indonesia, we contributed through the United Nations, t o
its relatively peaceful transition from colonial status to independence.

We

are now attempting to bring about a similar transition in Indo-China in the
face of a communist-led revolt.

Throughout this vast area of southern and

southeast Asia, we have in operation, today, programs of economic, technical
and military assistance and cultural exchange.

Only recently Congress passed

legislation to make available grain for India in an effort to forestall a
threatened frunine.
These programs represent a judicious use of the resources which we are
able to allocate to this region.

They are gestures of sincere friendship,

evidences of our 'villingness to help in deeds as well as words.

They are,

as all measures of this kind ought to be, a mixture of generosity and
reasonable self-interest.
As in the Philippines, there is no assurance that all of them will
accomplish the purposes for which they are intended.

As in the Philippines,

primary responsibility rests where it belongs -- with the peoples and
governments of the various recipient nations.
Taken as a whole, policy in southern and southeast Asia has had overwhelming support in both Houses of Congress.

This is another area of

substantial bipartisan agreement that the present controversy conceals.
With respect to Japan, World War II projected us into a situation of
primary responsibility.

As the Power principally responsible for the Japanese

defeat, we were compelled to occupy the vacumn which that defeat produced and
to exercise the primary authority which that occupation entailed.
After V-J Day, policy for Japan, conceived and prepared by the State and
Defense Departments under the President's direction was carried out by General

- 17 MacArthur until his replacement by General Ridgway as Supreme Commander.

Nost

available reports indicate that the Occupation has been admirably conducted.
The Japanese have made considerable progress in democratizing their social and
political institutions and, with substantial
much to restore their battered economy.

P~erican

i·le are moving, now, t0vrards a peace

settlement with or 1-rithout Soviet participation.
we hope that Japan vill

mal~e

assistance, have done

Once a treaty has been signed,

a contribution to the maintenance of peace and

orderly international progress .

We will, then, get out of that country but

still will be in a position to help out, if necessary, particularly with
respect to defense against aggression from the mainland .
There have been scattered criticisms of our occupation of Japan under
General Mac.l\rthur's direction.
that it was "too hard."
favorable.

Some have said that it was "too soft" and some

The balance of informed

opinion, however, has been

Certainly, there has been little criticism of it in Congress by

either party.

In this case, too, the sound and fury of partisan criticism of

Far Eastern policy has drowned out an extremely important area of agreement.
Having passed through a belt of calm encircling the Philippines, southern
and southeast Asia and Japan, we come to China which is at the very core of
the storm.

I should like to state at the outset that I do not believe any

reasonable person would have conducted China policy very much differently
than it has been conducted since 1945.

We have had three Secretaries of State

since the enU. of World War II -- James Byrnes, General Harshall and Dean
Acheson .

All three were confronted with a given set of facts.

All three

approached these facts in substantially the same WEnner.
To

~e

the point clearer, let us go back to V-J Day .

air and naval power in the Vlestern Pacific.
mostly service troops.

At that time, we had

lve had a small force in China,

General HacArthur had advised General Vledemeyer who was
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which were scheduled to serve in the Japanese occupation.
In Chine. there were tw·o major opposing military forces, one under the
control of the

Co~~~sts

and the other under the control of the Nationalists.

The Comnrunists were spread all over the North China countryside ready to move
immediately on the great Eastern cities and into

~1anchuri a .

If Civil

\Tar

came,

they had a decided positional advantage.
The Nationalist armies were in west and south China , far from the major
strategic centers.

They had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and

equipment but because of China's incredibly poor transportation system, they
could not get this superiority into position to make it effective.
In these circumstances we had to choose a course from among three
alternatives -- the same three which we have faced all over Asia: to get in,
to get out, or to help out.

In this case, to get in would have meant stopping

the impending civil war at whatever cost to ourselves, using our soldiers in
whatever number required, and assuming full responsibility for restoring all
of China to Chiang's rule.

Would the Chinese people, whose suspicion of foreign

interference in their internal affairs is traditional, have welcomed this move?
Would we, ourselves, in 1945 have tolerated committing an unknown number of our
men to China for an indefinite period?

To get in, in this sense, even if

desirable, was manifestly impracticable.
Could we have gotten out?

We could have; but it would have meant leaving

three million Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, since the National
Government was incapable of handling their repatriation.

It would have meant

abandoning the Nationalist government which we recognized and had supported
throughout the conflict without an opportunity t o restore stability to war-torn
China.

Furthermore, the evidence we had, then, indicated that most of the
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the factions together, in preventing civil war, and in reconstructing the
country.
Therefore, we took the third alternative.

We helped out -- not the

Chinese Communist but the legal, National Government of China.

We transported

by sea and air 400 to 500 thousand of Chiang Kai-shek's troops over and arotmd
the communist forces.
north China.

These troops vrent into key strategic sectors in east and

Fifty thousand American marines held such vital centers of

communication as Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao to prevent their seizure by the
Chinese communists.
Furthermore, we continued to supply the National Goverrunent with lendlease aid for months after the conclusion of the war.

By the end of

1945, we

had delivered sufficient tonnage to equip 39 divisions of ground forces and an
eight and one -third group air force.
In December 1945, Chiang Kai-shek held a numerical superiority over the
communists of five to one.

He had a monopoly of heavy equipment and mechanical

transport and an unopposed air arm.

He held the key communications centers.

Yet by December 1948, exactly three years later, this preponderance of
strength had been so dissipated that General Barr, hea d of our militBxy
advisory mission in China, was f orced to conclude that without direct involvement of the United States with its combat forces, the defeat of the Nationalists
on the mainland was inevitable.
What lies behind this amazing fai lure?
You will hear it blamed on General Marshall's attempt to mediate bet"lveen
the Nationalists and the Communists.

The fact is that the Nationalists

occupied more strategic military positions when General Marshall left China at
the end of

1946 than when he arrived at the beginning of 1946. The fact is
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that in mediating, General Marshall 1¥as following the established policy of t he
National Government.

For years, Chiang had claimed that he was trying t o settle

the communist question by political methods and not by civil war.
You will hear that the failure came about because General Marshall trie d
to force the Nationalists to take Communists into the government.

The f a ct i s

that Communists had been brought into the government by Chiang, himself, l ong
before Marshall ever arrived in China.

The fact is that not a s ingle cormm.:niot

was added to that government as a result of General Harshall;s mediation.

The

fact is that the Harshall Mission was welcomed by Chiang with open arms and he
prevailed on General Marshall to remain as mediator when the latter >;anted to
withdraw.
If any prominent

P~rican

in 1946 opposed Marshall's trip to China to

mediate the Chinese conflict between the major opposing

~Toups,

he gave n o

public and, as far as I can determine, private expression of his disagreement.
In December 1945, General HacArthur, Ge-neral vledemeyer and Admiral Spruance
sent the following message to Washington from the Far East before BeneTai
Marshall's departure:
It is suggested that United States assistance to China be
made available as a basis for negotiation by the .American
JUnbassador to bring together and effect a compromise
between the major opposing groups in order to promote
a unified democratir China.
J...

~

I

~

In June 1951, Admiral Spruance says that the negotiations between the
"major opposing groups" in this message meant between the Communists ru1d
.....

r/

Nationalists; General Wedemeyer fir st implied that it didn't and then that it
did.

General HacArthur, however, dissents and speaks of the Conununists a s "but

a nebulous threat" at the time.

You can unclerstand some of the difficultie s of

conducting foreign policy when there is disa greement among three prominent
military leaders as to who the "major opposing force s " in China were in 1945.

- 21 -

Another reason advanced for the Nationalist collapse on the mainland is
the inadequacy of American aid.

We are asked, in effect, to be ashamed of

ourselves and to feel guilty for failing to be more generous tmvards Chiang
Kai-shek,
But since V-J Day this country has extended military and economic aid
valued at about two billion dollars to the Chinese Government.
dollars of taxpayers money to Chiang Kai-shek.
argue the precise amount.

Two billion

It is possible, of course, to

Millions of words have been wasted in proving that

it WE!.s closer to one billion or three billion.

Can anyone honestly believe

that one billion or tvro billion or five billion dollars more aid would have
held the lid on the gigantic upheaval that has taken place in China the se past
five years?

As it ivas, an enormous part of the military equipment e;iven to

Chiang wound up in the hands of the communists.

In the comm1nist victory

parades during October 1949 in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and other cities ,
captured American arms and equipment streamed past the reviewing stands hour
after hour.

Where did this equipment come from?

surrendered or went over to the communists.
in Korea--in the l1ands of our eneraies.

From Nationalist armies which

Where is it now?

A lot of it is

Yet, the Administration is scolded for

not having Cl.one more of the same thing.
Can anyone honestly believe that more arms and a thousand American military
advisors in place of the 500 that served Chiang would have saved the National
Government on the mainland?
disastrous strategy?

Would additional aid have curbed that government's

Would it have created a fighting morale?

Vlould it have

put an end to corruption and raisrule?
The fact is that our help failed because there was missing in the
Nationalist
effectively.

Governn~nt

at that time, the will and ability to use our help

He could not supply the will and if we had tried to supply the
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Only since it has been confined to the island of Formosa hus Chiang's
Government begun to take the necessary measures to make itself truly responsive
to the needs of the ordinary Chinese people.

In these circumstances, there is

some hope that the economic and military assistance which we are still supplying
to the island of Formosa can prove effective.

We are justified in continuinG

that aid, just as \ve are justified in continuing to recognize the National
Government because it is becoming more representative of the real aspirations
of the Chinese people as the Connnunist regime in Peking grmrs le ss representative.

Since it emerged from the countryside; the latter has steadily drawn

avray from the people of China and their real intere sts .

It has become more

and more a tool of Russian foreign policy, permitti ng itself finally to be led
into a course of tossing thousands of Chinese lives to senseless slaughter in
the Korean aggression.
Despite the complexity of the Chinese situation, I believe that once the
facts ure fully appreciated, there will be little real disagreement on the part
of most Americans that the course we followed in China was about the only
reasonable one vre could have followed.
support for the National Government.

There vras not too little American
If anything, in the light of known

circumstances, there 1Yas too much.
The same is not true for Korea.

In that country, on June 25, 1950,

communist imperialism, for the first tilre since the end of vlorlcl Har II,
resorted to the tactic of armed invasion.
than Korea.

The issue immediately became larger

It became, in the final analysis, the issue of peace or general

war.
The response of the Free \Jorld to this issue was inm1ediate.
the President ordered fleet and 2.ir units into action as the

u.

On June 27th,
N. cc:lled upon

- 23 all nations to assist the victim of aggression.

Americans gave their spon-

taneous and wholehearted support to the decision.
The objectives vrhich we had in going into Korea, and which 'I-re still have,
is to preserve the south Korean Republic; to stop and to punish the aggression
against that Republic; to make clear to all would-be imperialists, as we failed
to make clear to Japanese end Nazi ilnperialists in the thirties, that the force
of tyra...nny will be met by the force of freedom; that there will be no cheap
conquests of the weak by the strong; that the greater the aggression the
greater will be the fearful retribution.

By stopping a l ocal aggression we

hope to prevent a general war later; by fighting in Korea now.we hope to suve
this land of ours from attack in the future.
When Captain James Jabara, the leading pilot of the United Nations in
Korea, landed back in the United States, he '\oms greeted first by a reporter
from his home town of vlichita, Kc-nsas.
in Korea'l"

The reporter asked: "vlhy are we fighting

Jo.bara answered: "So that we 'von't have to fight in Wichita."

These are the reasons we are in Korea.
sensible reasons.

They are fine and decent and

Those who speak disparagingly or cynically of them

prostitute the finest part of the American ideal--a willingness to sacrifices
now so that our children and our children's children shall live their lives in
a better and more satisfying world.
What we did not set out to do in Korea, what we were not required by any
mandate of the United Nations to do, was to unify all of Korea by force.

The

task of unifying Korea, is a task for the Korean people themselves with whatever
help may be given them by the United Nations.
to conquer Hanchuria.

vlhat we did not set out to do was

What we did not set out to do was to carry Chiang Kai-shek

back to the mainland on the shield of the United States.
out to do was to begin Vlorld Har III.

Whe.t we did not set
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out to do in Korea.

I trust that w·e shall not fail again.

Last November,

United Nations forces had scored the remarkable victory that carried them from
practically a beach-head at Pusan back to the 38th parallel.
we had accomplished what we had set out to do.

At that point

We had met the aggressors,

punished them severely, and all but destroyed their armies.

The security

of our forces made it necessary to advance some distance beyond the 38th
parallel.
When these forces had reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean
peninsula, some miles south of the Chinese border, I urged that we call a halt
to the advance and try to create a buffer zone along the Chinese Manchurian and
Korean frontier.

But, apparently, in the mistaken belief that the Chinese

Communists would not enter the war, that we could "end. the war by Christmas"
our troops were sent probing, in dangerously extended lines, towards the Chinese
border.
The rest is too well known to you to bear extensive repeating.
Chinese Communists entered the conflict.

We suffered a major defeat.

The
Some

of those who just a few weeks before had been most vociferous in urging our
advance to the Chinese border now began to press for two alternatives--either
the complete abandonment of Korea or the extension of the war all the vray into
Manchuria and beyond.

This "get in or get out" extreruism vrould have profited

no one but our enemies.
To have abandoned Korea, at that moment, would have been to
the very purposes for which we entered the conflict.

s~crifice

It would have meant

laying not only all of Korea but all of the Far East open to new attacks by
communist imperialism.

To have extended the war to the Chinese mainland, on

the other hand, vould have meant an involvement--when considered in the light
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time to support.

The latter course could have had only two outcomes.

If the

Soviet Union chose to back the Chinese Communists, it would have meant the
beginning of World War III.

If, on the other hand, the Russians chose to stay

out, it would have meant a unilateral involvement of this country on the Chinese
mainland.
In the first case we would have had the very thing which, in our own
interests and in the interests of civilization, we are trying t o prevent.

In

the second case , we would have had what General Bradley so aptly termed "wrong
war, wrong place, wrong time, wrong enemy."
Suppose we gained this cheap and easy victory over the Chinese Communists
which some seemed to think possible by the use of our air and sea povrer and
Chiang's troops.

What would we have gained except the continuing responsibility

of trying to keep the Generalissimo in power in a devastated China at untold
billions of dollars in costs.
And if we did not defeat the Chinese Communists easily, 'lvhat then?

He

would do as vre have done in Korea, send ground forces in after sea and air
power had failed to bring an immediate victory.
mainland can absorb millions of ground troops.

The vast maw of the Chinese
We could tie up the bulk of our

military resources in a secondary arena of combat, leaving western Europe--the
real prize--and other vital aree.s bare t o Soviet conquest.

If World 'Har III

must come, it will not be w·on or lost in South China .
We have to keep our eyes on the ob jective, and the place to do this at
the present time is in Korea .

Under General Ridgway's command, the United

Nations have once again returned to a position roughly comparable to the one
held l ast December .

Once again a moment of decision is at hand.

It is a nmment to restate the aims of our foreign policy.

That policy is
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pe~ce--

not peace at any price, but peace as long as it is humanly and decently and
honorably possible to strive for it.

To achieve that peace '"e must be prepared

to negotiate, provided the aggressors recognize the error of their ways and,
provided; the negotiations lead to a settlement that achieves our purposes.
Appeasement and negotiation are not the same things.

To use means other than

military to achieve reasonable international objectives is in keeping with our
best traditions.

We would do well to be wary of partisan tongues in this country

that are q_uick to lick the label of appeasement on every non-military nction we
take.

Such tongues could lead our foreign policy into repeated blind alleys

and, ultimately, into chaos, unnecessary war or confused retreat.
As to specific policy based on these principles of no appeasement and
peace, I believe the facts of the situation suggest that the wisest course in
Korea at this time would be for the qN forces to remain in the vicinity of
the 38th parallel so that the South Korean Republic can be reestablished in its
own right.

Beyond that, South Korean forces should be sent further northward

to the vicinity of the 39th parallel so as to increase the defensive strength
of South Korea and to establish a status q_uo that can be maintained .

In my

opinion this move will be a long step towards stopping Stalin's plans to
involve us in all-out war in Asia; it will allow South Koreans, ,.,ith UN help,
to start rebuilding their country, and it will have accomplished our original
purpose of making clear that aggression does not pay .

South Korea should

assume an increasingly active role in its own defense and ve should seek
greater military commitments for Korea from other UN members with a vie,·r to
reducing the size of the funerican contingent.
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There are two ways to live in freedom ln
an Insecure world. One Is to meet, every
day, a segment or the International responsibilities that freedom entails, to make them
a regular part of our lives. The other is to
Ignore these responsib111ttes untll a new
tyranny has set the world aflame, and, then,
drop everything in a last minute effort to
keep the fire from reaching our homes.
Under the leadership of the President, we
have been trying to follow the first way.
We have used and are using such resources-economic, technical, cultural, and m111taryas we can spare, as a form of Insurance to
promote the cause of peace, freedom, and
progress, and to minimize, thereby, the possib!llty of the rise or aggressive tyranny to
the point where It might be ln a position to
strike for world domination.
The resources which we have available for
this International purpose are not unlimited.
We can afford to use them only where there
Is reasonable expectation that they wlll accomplish the objective for which they are
Intended. In general, this will be In situations where the peoples and governments
most directly Involved are alive to the meanIng and obligations of freedom and wlll
shoulder these obligations If given a helping
hand.
Whatever policy we pursue toward other
nations, all of us--directly or Indirectlyshare responsibility for tt. All of us gain, If
It Is the best possible course. All or us, as
well as generations yet to come, will suffer
very real losses If 1t Is not.
You wUI note that I said the best possible
courEe. In the life of each of us, there Ia
usu:Uly a considerable gap between our hopes
and our accomplishments, between the Ideal
and the actuality. The same thing Is true
In foreign policy. The world we live In Ia
Inhabited by men, not gods, and the International situations In which we find ourselves usually reflect all of the shortcomings
and Imperfections to which mankind Is heir.
In some Instances, our foreign policy will
follow a particular course to meet a glven
set of circumstances. In the light of all

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or

HON. 1\UKE MANSFIELD
OF MONTANA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Speaker, under
unanimous consent, I am placing in the
REcor.D a copy of a speech which I gave
before the annual meeting of the Montana Bar Association in Butte, Mont., on
June 30, 1951:
THE

FOREIGN POLICY OF TilE UNITED STATES

Let me begin by pointing out that foreign
policy Is not a formula out of the laboratory
of an alchemist. It Is not a potion which Is
guaranteed to cure the Ills of the nation
and the world's Ills In a single dose. There
Is nothing supernatural about foreign policy
and none or us need to stand In awe of it.
Foreign policy Is made by human beings !or
human Eltuatlons. What all of us need Is to
learn more about It--Its problems, Its posslb!lltles and Its limitations-because It has a
very profound efi'ect upon our live:;. The
more we know about It, the more we can do
to bring lt under rational democratic control.
Our foreign J:Ollcy is simply the course or
action which we take to safeguard the Nation
and guide Its progress ln a very Imperfect
and highly dangerous world. Because of the
nature of the postwar world, the course we
have taken since 1945 bas Involved a use or
our resources on a greater scale than ever
before In peacetime to Influence developments ln other parts of the world. The use
or a prudent part or our resources In this
fashion Is not waste. It ls not a callous
disregard of our domestic needs In the Inter~
est of foreign powers. It Is a sound Investment In the security and well-being of this
generation of Americans and the generations
that will follow us. If we do not make this
Investment, the possiblllties are multiplied
that we shall waste resources many times
greater ln a third general war at some not
too distant date.
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these circumstances It will seem like the
best possible course and few, If any of us,
will criticize It or raise any questions about
lt. Then, 3 or 4 years later, some who have
an oversupply of the wisdom of hindsight
and a special aptitude !or Monday-morning
quarterbacking, will suddenly discover that
the course that we took 3 or 4 years before
was all wrong. Naturally, to exercise this
kind of wisdom, one has to have a very short
memory and a well-developed ability to
transplant. One has to be able to forget
all the circumstances that existed at the
time the course was originally set, and to
transplant that course Into the circumstances that exist today.
All o! us have some of this kind of wisdom. It Is the kind of wisdom that makes us
say to ourselves or our friends "!! I had only
bought a hundred head of cattle back In
1940, I would be In fine shape today because
the price of beef Is high In 1951." When
we Indulge our fancy In this way, of course,
we have to forget that back In 1940 we didn't
have tte price of a hundred head of cattle;
or If we had, we would not have been able
to buy a ranch to graze them on. A little
of this wisdom doesn't do us any damage.
It Is a harmless pastime when practiced by
Individuals. We think about "what might
have been" for a few moments and then go
about the very real business of living In the
present. But In connection with :foreign
policy, I! we keep at this Monday morning
quarterbacking day In and day out, month
1n and month out, year In and year out, It
occupies so much of our time and energy as
a Nation that we have very little left o!
either to deal with the pressing situations or
the day. And some Americans are doing exactly that. The result Is that the attention
o! all o! us Is deflected !rom the pressing
problems o! current International life. If
you have felt confused about foreign policy,
and who among us hasn't, you can explain
much o! that confusion by the constant
harangue to which we are subjected to look
backward, tnstcad of around us and forward.
It Is a harangue that originates In the same
kind o! mentality that told us to look back
962236-40018

at the "good old days" when we were trying
to fight our way out o! the depression In the
thirties.
What you hear today Is that everything
would be all right with the Nation and the
world If only we hadn't tried, during the
war, to get along with the Russians; 1! only
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill hadn't signed the Tehran and
Yalta agreements, and President Truman the
Potsdam agreement. What these Mondaymorning quarterbacks conveniently forget,
of course, Is that 1! we hadn't been fighting
with some allies on our side In World War
II we might still be locked In combat with
Germany and Japan or have been destroyed
by those countries. We might have had
casualties of five million or ten m1111on or
twenty-five mUllon Instead o! the mUllon or
more that we suffered. What the Monday
morning quarterbacks forget Is that we got
along with Russian and made those agreements at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam In
order to shorten World War n and to make
an attempt at establishing a aaats for an
enduring peace. Who among us, at the time,
objected to these purposes? 0! course circumstances have changed since 1945.
Of
course some of the decisions taken at these
conferences are Inapplicable In the present
situation. This does not mean that the
agreements at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam
were the work of scoundrels or Incompetents.
Least of all does It mean that If these agreements had never been made the Nation would
be better off. That wm be known only when
the events of this century-all the eventsare vlewecl In the perspective of history.
But Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam belong
to a past era-the era of the rise of fascist
totalitarianism and Its defeat. Today, the
primary threat to our Nation, to peace, and
to democratic progress stems !rom a new
totalltarlanlam which has Its core In Soviet
Imperialism. President Roosevelt at Yalta
and President Truman at Potsdam both tried
to prevent a development of thla kind. Both
sought, at the end of the greatest war, to .
put a stop to further wars and the threat
of wars. They tried to avoid a spUt amo~
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the victors and to bring together all of the
nations of the world Into the forward surge
of mankind. Isn't that what all of us
wanted In 1945? Was It wrong to make this
attempt? I think that the Ideal was well
worth striving for and I think we should
continue to strive for it.
Events since 1945, however, have clearly
shown that the Ideal of a world without the
threat of war remains, as It long has been,
one of the most elusive dreams of mankind.
As a Nation, we cannot lose ourselves In
dreams of the future, just as we cannot talce
refuge In the mlght-have-beens of the past.
We must continue to live with the realities
of the present.
And the most significant of these realities
Is that there Is once again loose In the world
a nation bent upon world domination. To
meet this new situation, the course of our
foreign p::Jlicy Is being adjusted as rapidly
ns those who wring their hands over the
past or who are lest In the future wlll
permit.
By the end of 1946 and the beginning of
1947, the alms of the Soviet Union had become quite clear. While this country had
disarmed hastily, the Russians had continued to keep an enormous mass of soldiers
In a state of readiness, and had embarked
upon a program of ruthless expansion. They
had not only ccmpromlsed the Independence
of countries along their frontier, but International communism was eating Its way Into
Western Europe via the roads of economic
misery, social discontent and political 1nstab111ty. Greece and Turkey were under
relentless Comrnunlst pressure.
It does not take an expert In foreign
allalrs to see what a collapse In Western
Europe and the Middle East at that time
would have meant to the security of this
Nation and to the world.
Th? United States plus Western Europe
plus the:.r associated countries now have an
annua11=roductlon of steel and pig Iron more
than 4 times that of the Soviet world;
they produce 3 times as much coal and
10 times as much pet~oleum. Move the resources of Western Europe and the asso062236-40018

elated countries to the Soviet side and the
comparisons change drastically.
But beyond the naked fact of the balance
of power, the nations which were about to
collapse In late 1947 were the birthplace and
cradle of western civilization. The Institutions under which we live, the hopes we
cherish, the origins of most of our citizens,
were rooted In those countries. All of them
have contributed In some fashion to life as
we know it. With a return to stability they
could be expected to continue to contribute
to the advance of civilization. Were we,
then, to abandon them, In 1947, to a new
barbarism?
We met this threat to the western world
with great unity of purpose. On March 12,
1947, the President proposed to Congress that
the United States extend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Under the
leadenhlp of a great Republican Senator,
the late Arthur vandenberg, Congress passed
the necessary legislation by an overwhelmIng bipartisan vote. This measure-the
Truman doctrine-was the real beginning of
our struggle to guard the Nation against the
new tyzanny looming on the horizon. From
this doctrine has sprung the Marshall plan,
the North Atlantic Treaty, the mutual defense assistance program, economic and
military assistance to countries In the Far
and Near East and other significant actions
of foreign policy. These are the programs
which have so far prevented the S:>vlet
Union from striking for world domination
and precipitating a general war. They have
had, until recently, wide bipartisan support.
I need not review all the details Of these
programs, but I should like to survey briefly
some of the progress which bas been made
In carrying them out. Just this month, at
General Eisenhower's request, I had occasion to visit Europe and to observe this
progress first-hand.
As of the first months of 1951 the basic
alms of the Marshall plan had been largely
although not completely, achieved. The
Communists In Western Europe had made
every effort to sabotage the proj..-ct, and they
had failed. I ndustrial output had risen al-
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most 40 percent above the level of 1938; trade
and exchange dltncultles had lessened considerably; and there were good prospects for
continuing economic Improvement.
The threat of political collapse, so !H'>Jte In
1947, has been averted. Discontent, by no
means, has dlsappeared-as the results or the
recent eltction In Italy show-but ~he gloom
of defeatl:::m that hung over the rc;:ion has
lifted. Europeans dare to believe a:;ain In
a future of freedom.
To protect these gains In We~ tern E•.lrope, a
far-reaching security system has b~t>n established. The United Nations cha1 ter hus
provided the basis for this system. It explicitly recognizes the Inherent and lUndamental right of member states to dctend
themselves collectively against attack and
provides !or the formation of regional security arrangements. Under these pro·;tslons
we had, In September 1947, already Joined
with the Latin American countries In establishing a 11ystem of mutual defense !or the
Western Hemisphere. After the passage of
the Vandenberg resolution by the S:mate
In June 1948, with Its obvious reference to
the North Atlantic community, this country
began to work out a plan of mutual defense
with the Western European nations. On
April 4, 1949, twelve nations-the United
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal--signed
the North Atlantic Treaty.
The purpose of this treaty Is strictly defensive. It threatens no nation except a
would-be aggressor. It operates primarily as
a deterrent, serving formal notice that an
attack upon any part of the Atlantic community w!ll be met with the united resistance of the whole. I! the RU!:!:Ians ever
nourished the expectation that the rlpene:l
plum of a recovered Europe could be plucked
with Impunity, they now know differently.
The organization to carry out the obligations of this treaty Is already In operation.
Most of the m!l!tnry commanders have been
appointed and the strategic plans nrc being
placed In readiness. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, we are trying to ftll
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what General Eisenhower called the great,
the crying need (for) the Impedimenta o!
armies, of navies, of air forces.
The sudden outbreak of the Korean aggression compelled the free world to revise Ita
estimate of Soviet Intentions. We have
speeded up the delivery of military supplies
to Europe and Increased our commitments
In this respect. A decision has been made to
Include Wc:::tern German contributions to the
defense pool and consideration Is being gtven
to adding others !rom Spa!n.
In a further effort to bolster western defenses and to fortify the morale of the western Europeans who dread an occupation by
Red troops, even though the Soviet Union
might eventually be defeated, the United
States recently decided to send four Army
dlvts!ons to Western Germany In addition to
the two already there. There was considerable opposition to this step in some quarters !or several reasons, prominent among
which was a fear that large American forces
might be drawn Into a land war against the
vast populations commanded by the Soviet
Union. Secretary ot Defense Marshall, however, has made clear that the plan Is for the
Western Europeans to supply the bulk of the
land armies needed !or their defense.
That Soviet aggression can be deterred has
been demonstrated over and over again. The
record which has been achieved during the
past 5 years has come from following a course
of no appeasement, cooperation with free nations, and devotion to peace. We have negotiated with the Russians-as In the case
of Berlin-but we have not appeased. We
have yielded to the wishes ot our All!es on
some Issues and they have yielded to ours
on others. Here at home we have refused
to retreat Into a new Isolationism and, at
the same time, we have held In check those
who think that a bomb dropped on Moscow
will not only begin a war but end it.
What Is the record of the past 5 years In
br!e!? The Soviet Union has not dared to
precipitate a general war; Yugoslavia bas
broken loose from the Moscow chains;
Greece--the gateway to the Middle East-bas been saved from destruction. Efforts

'1
ot the Communists

to capture Western
Europe by captalizlng on economic misery
and social unrest have been thwarted by the
European recovery plan. The menace of
Communist armed aggression has been counteracted by the North Atlantic defense program. The Berlin airlift was a dramatic
demonstration of the manner In which western determination and technical ability can
create a situation In which bona fide negotiations with the Russians became possible.
The record of our foreign policy In Europe
Ia a record of accomplishment, written In
aplte of the dire predictions of a few In our
midst who continue to Ignore the responslbllltles of the hour while they read and reread the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements.
Or I! It Is not these agreements, then It Is
the Far East that occupies them practically
to the exclusion of the rest of the world. It
Is aa though the sun of International events
not only rlaes In the east but also sets In the
east.
This Is the region that baa given rise to
most of the conflict over our foreign policy.
The typhoon now raging about Capital Hill
In Washington originated In the vicinity of
Formosa. Typhoon Is one or the few words
ln the English language that Is derived from
the Chinese. It Is taken from two Chinese
characters--"dle" and "tung" which, together, mean "big wind." It Is quite a typhoon-this controversy over tar-eastern
policy-and, like most of the storms that
blow out or the China Sea, It Is full of sound
and fury.
This sound and fury, unfortunately, conceals a wide belt of calm-an area of substantial agreement upon which a stable fareastern policy can be conducted. There is,
tor example, practically no disagreement
among responsible persons In the Government as to the fundamental facts of the
Asian situation today. The administration
and qualified Members cf Congress have long
recognized them and General MacArthur, In
his farewell address to both Houses, reviewed
them.
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In Asia, today, we are race-to-face with a
transition of
continental proportions.
Events of the past few years have stirred
half the population of the earth-more than
a billion human beings-Into a state of restless agitation.
These people di1Ier widely In race, culture,
and outlook. In some ways, however, their
lot has been the same. Over the centuries,
most of them acquiesced In the rule of native
tyrants or the control of foreigners. Most or
them endured-seemln;;ly without complaint--a ll!e or Ignorance, disease and Incredible poverty. Bllllons were born, lived
out a brief life span-usually under 30
years-and died. Millions were swept away
In a stroke, by !amine, flood or epidemic.
These catastrophes were quickly forgotten In
the struggle of the living to survive. Life
went on-compelling and unchanging. This
was the "Changeless East."
But beneath the surface serenity of resignation, a ferment of discontent has been
churning tor decades, building up great pressures for social and political change. Prom
time to time, there were warning signs, as
for example, the Chinese Revolution of 1911
and the rioting and Insurrections throughout southern and sou thea[· Asia between the
two wars.
Then came World War II and the surface
calm gave way once and for all under Its
p:>werful Impetus. Vast forces were released.
Prom Korea to Pakistan, from Mongolia to
the Philippines-tidal waves of unrest rolled
over this Immense area. Millions or people
were caught up In the cross-currents, propelled by two fundamental drives-a common determination to end foreign domination and to do something a~out the crushing
poverty which, for centuries, had produced
the cycle of birth, miserable life and early
death.
The transition which Is taking place In the
Far East Is not a gentle one. In many places,
It already has engendered violence on a scale
unprecedented In recent history. Millions
h:.ve died as a direct or Indirect result of the
clvU conflicts In China and southeast Asia
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and In the religious strife that marked the
partition of the Indian subcontinent. Mil·
lions more have been uprooted and are on
the move. They are seeking new roots to
sustain Hfe and to give It meaning and
direction.
These, then, are the facts of the Far East
or 1951. Half the world 1s In transition,
and often, In violent transition. This transition holds tremendous posslblllties for good
but It also carries the seeds of a potentially
enormous evU.
I
If the new nations of the Far East can
maintain their Independence and the new
governments can deal effectively with the
accumulated problems of their people, there
Is every reason to bel1eve that they wlll make
a profound contribution to their own development, to the cause of peace and to the general advancement of mankind. It, on the
other hand, they fall victims to a ne'Y Imperialism-whether It be of the type recently
advanced by Japan or the more subtle type
now emanating from the Soviet Union-If
this should occur, then the rest of the world
and we as a part of It, would be exposed to
a grave danger.
There Is a real prospect of this happening
because In the confusion and frustrations of
the hour, men often turn to the easy way out,
the quick and unreasoned solution to their
difficulties. Communism or other reactionary
movements, based on such slogans as "Asia
for the Asians" offer very real enticements,
howe't"er delusive, to the hungry and discontented.
Some may wish that the facts In the Par
East were otherwise. Some may long for
the old days of the "changeless East" and Its
"unspoiled charm," but these cannot be
recalled.
The fact 1s that we must conduct tar
eastern policy within the framework of a
"changing East"-a rapidly, erratically and,
frequently, violently "changing East." To
Imagine that the situation 1s otherwise will
lead us to build a pol1cy on sands of unreal1ty and to court, thereby, Its repeated
collapses.
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But recognition of the facts of tbe situation In Asia is only one prerequisite to
sound pol1cy. For the Far East Is only a
part of the larger framework of foreign pollcy
which Is the globe ltsel!. And far eastern
pol1cy, If It Is to serve the Nation, must be
viewed In that total perspective. We cannot
concentrate our attention exclusively on Asia.
To do so, 1s to Ignore regions which, at this
moment In history, are at least as vital.
In the Far East we can bring to bear a
prudent part of the resources which we have
avallable for International purposes In an
effort to Influence developments In the direction or peace, freedom, and progress. We
cannot deploy all our resources to that area
without leaving others, such as Europe and
the Middle East, dangerously exposed.
There are some situations In the Far East
with which, by working constructively with
others, we can deal effectively. In these situations we should act, and we are acting. But
under no circumstances ought we to assume
unilateral responslblllty for everything that
happens In Asia or for the future of that
vast continent. Under no circumstances
should we overcommit ourselves, even In the
name of an anti-Communist crusade.
Korea Is not the only country In the world
that Hves In the shadow of Communist lmperlal1sm. Communism, Itself, Is not the
first form of tyranny that has threatened
the world, nor Is It, necessarlly, the last.
The way to a world of freedom and International decency Is long and diMcult and we
wlll do well to draw judiciously upon our
strength as we move along lt.
In general, that Is what we have done ln
the Far East and that Is what we are doing
now. Mistakes have been made and others
may be expected. Foreign policy 1s made by
human beings and human beings make mistakes. As I have already pointed out, all of
us contribute directly or Indirectly to our
foreign policy and we share responslblllty for
its success or !allure.
I think, however, that we need not be
ashamed of the course we have pursued 1n
the Far East for 5 years. When It ls viewed
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ln Its entirety, within the framework of the
facts of Asia and the larger framework of
the global situation-the record Is good. I
go further and suggest that beneath the
sound and fury of the present controversy,
lt will be found that most persons In this
country-regardless of party-generally have
supported and wm continue to support that
policy.
Let us examine this thesis against the record of our activity In the Far East since 1945.
In the Ph111pplnes we fulfilled promptly
our long-standing pledge to grant Independence to the Islands. We kept our wartime
promise to aid In reconstruction, providing
tor this purpose technical assistance, hundreds of m1lllons of dollars of direct compensation to those who suffered losses, and
surplus property of enormous value at a
negligible prtce. In 1946, we also worked out
mutual defense arrangements that are designed to safeguard the Ph111pplnes from a
repetition of Invasion as well as to enhance
our own security.
AB far as I can determine, there has been
no serious opposition to any of these measures In Congress or out of Congress. They
have had wide bipartisan support. It Is
not over the Pha•.pplne policy, then, that the
present controversy rages.
But In spite of our efforts and those of
many conscientious Filipinos, the islands
have not ;...ade the progress which might have
been expected.
Last year there were alarming reports that
the Ph1llpplnes might ~;o the way of China.
The reasons advanced were 1r.uch the same.::orruption In government, unfair economic
advantage to a favored few at the expense of
the many, and the growth In strength of a
Communist-led revolutionary group in the
countryside.
What could we have done In these circumstances? Reverse the Independence granted
a few short years ago and reoccupy the
islands? To Ulustrate the difficulty in such
a course, I might point out that when we
requested permission to post marines as
guards.at our Embassy In Manna because of
the tense situation, the Ph111pplne Govern962236-40018

ment hotly rejected the request as an affront to Its sovereignty. But even tr the ,
course of reoccupatlon were feasible, the
direct control of the PhUipplnes would require an enormous allocation of our economic and mUitary resources. What would
be left for other areas? Are the American
people willing to assume an Increased tax
burden and new casualty lists for this purpose?
A second alternative would be to abandon
the Islands to their fate and risk their fallIng Into unfriendly hands. One consideration-and there are others-Indicates how
dangerous this co,_;rse would be. We regard
Formosa as vital to the security of the Pacific. How much more so are the Ph111pplnes.
Confronted with a set of facts of this kind,
our Phlllpplne pollcy has taken the only
direction ,that Is practical. We have not
assumed primary responsibility for the
political administration, the Internal security or the domestic economy of the Ph111pplnes. The F111plno people were demanding,
In effect, the right to deal with these problems themselves when tbey sought Independence. We conceded them that right when
we set them free. These prob!e··.1s, properly, are the primary responsib111ty of the
Fil1plnos. Our role, necessarlly, Is that of a
neighbor who has had a long and close relationship with the Islands. In this role we
have increased our m111tary assistance and
our technical aid to help them meet the
present abnormal situation. The President
has gone a step further and has called upon
the Ph111pplne Government to undertake
certain basic reforms as a condition for additional economic help. The Filipinos have
given evidence or a willingness to make the
necessary improvements and Congress is now
considering a measure which wm provide
that help.
We cannot be certain that this policy will
succeed. There 1s no assurance that as a
result of it the Philippines will emerge as a
progressive and stable member or the free
world. In the planning and execution of
foreign policy there are rarely certainties.
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The most that we can hope for ls that we
have chosen the best possible course of action
in the llght of a glven set of circumstances.
Many people have complained about the
sltuatlon In the Phlllpplnes but no one, so
far as I am aware, has offered a pollcy approach dltrerlng basically from the three I
have suggested here. That ls--get ln, get
out, or help out. The way we have chosen
1s neither the way of lmperlallsm whlch 1s to
get ln, nor the way of lsolatlonlsm whlch 1s
to get out. It ls the American way, whlch
ls to help out.
I have dwelt at length on the Phlllpplnes
for lt lllustrates the com:Jlex problems whlch
confront our pollcy-makers elsewhere ln the
Far East. In southern and southeast Asla
we have also sought to deal wlth the facts
of the situation ln the same way-neither
by getting ln nor getting out, but by helping
out. We have cooperated wlth many friendly
na tlons ln thls reglon.
In the caseo of Indonesia, we contributed
through the Unlted Nations, to lts relatively
peac~ful transltlon from colonial status to
independence. We are now attempting to
bring about a slmllar transition In Indochina In the face of a Communist-led revolt. Throughout this vast area o! southern
and southeast Asla, we have In operation,
today, programs o! economic, technical and
mllltary assistance and cultural exchange.
Only recently Congress passed legislation to
make avallable graln for Indla ln an efJort
to forestall a threatened ramlne.
These programs represent a judlclous use
or the resources whlch we are able to allocate to this region. They are gestures of
sincere friendship, evidences of our willIngness to help In deeds as well as words.
They are, as all measures o! this kind ought
to be, a :nlxture o! generosity and reasonable self-Interest.
As In the Philippines, there Is no assurance that all or them will accompllsh the
purposes for which they are Intended. As
In the Philippines, primary responslblllty
rests where it belongs-with the peoples and
governments of the various recipient nations.
Taken as a whole, pollcy in southern and
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southeast Asia has bad overwhelming support In both Houses of Congress. Thls la
another area o! substantial bipartisan agreement that the present controversy conceals.
With respect to Japan, World War II projected us Into a situation of primary responslblllty. As the power principally responsible 1or the Japanese defeat, we were
compelled to occupy the vacuum which that
defeat produced and to exercise the primary
authonty which that occupation entailed.
After VJ-day, pollcy !or Japan, conceived
and prepared by the State and Defense Departments under the President's direction
was carried out by General MacArthur until
his replacement by General Ridgway as Supreme Commander. Most available reports
lndlcntl' that the occupation has been admirably conducted.
The Japanese have
made considerable progress in democratizing their social and political Institutions
and, with substantial American assistance,
have done much to restore their battered
economy. We are movlng, now, toward a
peace settlement with or without Soviet
partlclpatlon. Once a treaty has been slgned,
we hope that Japan wlll make a contribution
to the maintenance of peace and orderly International progress. We wlll, then, get out
o! that country but stlll wlll be ln a position
to help out, l! necessary, particularly wlth
respect to defense against aggression from
the mainland.
There have been scattered criticisms of our
occupation o! Japan under General MacArthur's direction. Some have said that lt
was "too so!t" and some that lt was "too
hard." The balance of Informed oplnlon,
however, has been favorable. Certainly,
there has been little criticism or lt In Congress by either party. In thls cas~. too, the
sound and fury or partisan crltlclsm or fareastern pollcy had drowned out an extremely
Important area of agreement.
Having pas~ed through a belt or calm
enclrcllng the Philippines, southern an<1
southeast Asia and Japan. we come to Chlna
which Is at the very core or the storm. I
should llke to state at the out11et that I do
not believe any reasonable pers:m woul<1
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have conducted China policy very much dlfterently than It has been conducted since
1945. We have had three Secretaries or
State since the end of World War II-James
Byrnes, General Marshall, and Dean Acheson.
All three were confronted with a given set
of facts. All three approached these facts
In substantially the same manner.
To make the point clearer, let us go back to
VJ-day. At that time, we had air and naval
power In the Western Pacific. We had a
small torce In China, mostly service troops.
General MacArthur had advised General
Wedemeyer who was then In command In
China that he could not spare additional men
!rom his armies which were scheduled to
serve In the Japanese occupation.
In China there were two major opposing
military forces, one under the control of the
Communists and the other under the control
ot the Nationalists. The Communists were
spread all over the North China countryside
ready to move Immediately on the great eastern cities and Into Manchuria. If civil war
came, they had a decided positional advantage.
The Nationalist armies were In west and
south China, tar !rom the major strategic
centers. They had overwhelming superiority
in numbers and equipment but because of
China's Incredibly poor transportation system, they could not get this superiority Into
position to make It effective.
In these circumstances we had to choose
a course !rom among three alternatives-the same three which we have faced all over
Asia: To get In, to get out, or to help out.
In this case, to get In woUld have meant
stopping the Impending civil war at whatever coat to ourselves, using our soldiers In
whatever number required, and assuming
!ull responsibility for restoring all of China
to Chiang's rule. Would the Chinese people, wh<>se suspicion or foreign Interference
In their Internal affairs Is traditional, have
welcomed this move? Would we, ourselves,
In 1945 have tolerated committing an unknown number of our men to China for an
Indefinite period? To get In, In this sense,
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even It desirable, was manl!estly impracticable.
Could we have gotten out? We could
have; but It would have meant leaving 3,000,0CO Japane!:e soldiers and c1v1llans In China,
since the Nationalist Government was
Incapable of handling their repatriation. It
would have meant abandoning the National1st Government which we recognized and
had supported throughout the conflict without an opportunity to restore stab111ty to
war-torn China. Furthermore, the evidence
we had, then, Indicated that most of the
Chinese people still looked to this Government !or leadership In bringing all the !actions together, In preventing civil war, and
In reconstructing the country.
Therefore, we took the third alternative.
We helped out--not the Chinese Communist
but the legal, Natlonallst Government of
China. We transported by sea and air 400 to
500 thousand o! Chiang Kal-sbek's troops
over and around the Communist forces. These
troops went Into key strategic sectors In
east and north China. Fi!ty thousand AmerIcan marines held such vital centers of communication as Pe1p1ng, Tientsin, and Tslngtao to prevent their seizure by the Chinese
Communists.
Furthermore, we continued to supply the
National Government with lend-lease aid
!or months after the conclusion of the war.
By the end of 1945, we had delivered su!tlclent tonnage to equip 39 divisions o!
ground forces and an 8% -group air force.
In December 1945, Chiang Ka1-shek held a
numerical superiority over the Communists
o! 5 to 1. He had a monopoly of heavy
equipment and mechanical transport and
an unoppoEed air arm. He held the key
communications centers. Yet by December
1948, exactly 3 years later, this preponderance o! strength had been so dissipated that
General Barr, head o! our m111tary advisory
mission In China, was forced to conclude that
without direct Involvement o! the United
States with Its combat forces, the defeat
of the Nationalists on the mainland was
Inevitable.
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What lies behind this amazing fatlure?
You w111 hear It blamed on General Marshall's attempt to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists. The fact Is
that the Nationalists occupied more strategic
military positions when General Marshall left
China at the end of 1946 than when he arrived at the beginning of 1946. The fact Is
that In mediating, General Marshall was
following the established policy of the Nationalist Government. For years Chiang had
clajmed that he was trying to settle the
Communist question by political methods
and not by civil war.
You will hear that the failure came about
because General Marshall tried to force the
Nationalists to take Communists Into the
government. The fact Is that Communists
had been brought Into the government by
Chiang, himself, long before Marshall ever
arrived In China. The fact Is that not a 1\lngle Communist was added to that government as a result of General Marshall's mediation. The fact Is that the Marshall mission
was welcomed by Chiang with open arms and
he prevailed on General Marshall to remain
as mediator when the latter wanted to withdraw.
If any prominent American In 1946 opposed Marshall's trip to China to mediate the
Chinese con1Uct between the major opposing
groups, he gave no public and, as far as I
can determine, private expression of his disagreement. In December 1945, General MacArthur, General Wedemeyer, and Admiral
Spruance sent the following message to
Washington from the Far East before General Marshall's departure:
"It Is suggested that United States assistance to China be made available as a basis
for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and etJect a compromise
between the major opposing groups In order
to promote a unified democratic China."
In June 1951, Admiral Spruance says that
the negotiations between the "major opposIng groups" In this message meant between
the Communists and Nationalists; General
Wedemeyer first Implied that It didn't and
then that It did. General MacArthur, how962236--40018

ever, dissents and speaks of the Communists
as "but a nebulous threat" at the time. You
can understand some of the difficulties of
conducting foreign policy when there ls disagreement among three prominent mUitary
leaders as to who the "major opposing
forces" In China were ln 1945.
Another reason advanced for the Nationalist collapse on the mainland Is the Inadequacy of American ald. We are asked, In
etiect, to be ashamed or ourselves and to feel
guUty for falling to be more generous towards Chiang Kal-shek.
But since VJ-day this country has extended miHtary and economic aid valued
at about two btlllon dollars to the Chinese
Government. Two billion dollars of taxpayers• money to Chiang Kal-shek. It Is possible, ot course, to argue the precise amount.
Millions of words have been wasted In provIng that It was closer to one billion or three
billion. Can anyone honestly believe that
one billion or two billion or five billion dollars more aid would have held the lid on
the gigantic upheaval that has taken place
In China these past 5 years? As It was, an
enormous part of the military equipment
given to Chiang wound up In the hands of
the Communists. In the Communist victory
parades during October 1949 In Pelplng,
Tientsin, Shanghai, and other cities, captured American arms and equipment
streamed past the reviewing stands hour
after hour. Where did this equipment
come from? From Nationalist armies which
surrendered or went over to the Communists.
Where Is It now? A lot of It Is In KoreaIn the hands of our enemies. Yet, the administration Is scolded for not having done
more of the same thing.
Can anyone honestly believe that more
arms and a thousand American mllltary advisors In place of the 500 that served Chiang
would have saved the National Government
on the mainland? Would additional ald
have curbed that government's disastrous
strategy? Would lt have created a fighting
morale? Would lt have put an end to corruption and .ntsrule?
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Tbe fact Is that our help failed because
there waa ml.aalng In the Nationalist Government at that time, the will and ability to
uae our help eft'ectlvely. We could not supply the will, and If we had tried to supply
the abUity, In all probability we would have
had to get In completely.
Only since It baa been confined to the Island of Formosa baa Chiang's government
begun to take the neceasary mcaaures to
make Itself truly responsive to the needs or
the ordinary Chinese people. In these circumstances, there Is aome hope that the
economic and military aaslstance which we
are atul supplying to the Island or Formosa
can prove eft'ectlve. We are justified In continuing that aid, just aa we are justified In
continuing to recognize the National Government, because It Ia becoming more representative of the real aaplratlons of the
Chinese people aa the Communist regime
1n Peking grows leas representative. Since
1t emerged !rom the countryside, the latter
baa steadily drawn away from the people of
China and tbelr real 1ntefe&t8. It has become more and more a tool or Russian foreign policy, ~rmlttlng Itself finally to be
led Into a course or toaslng thousands of
.Chinese Uvea to senseless alaughter In the
Korean aggresalon.
Despite the complexity or the Chinese
situation, I believe that once the !acts are
fully appreciated, there will be little real
dl.aagreement on the part of most Americans that the course we followed In China
was about the only reasonable one we
could have followed. Tbere was not too little American support !or the National Government. U anything, In the light or
known circumstances, there was too much.
Tbe same Is not true ror Korea. In that
country, on June 25, 1950, Communist Imperialism, for the first time since the end
of World War II, resorted to the tactic of
armed Invasion. The lasue Immediately became larger than Korea. It became, In the
final analysis, the l.asue or peace or general war.
The response of the free world to this Issue
waa Immediate. On June 27, the P:esldent
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ordered fleet and air units Into action aa the
UN called upon all nations to assist the victim
of aggression. Americana gave their spontaneous and wholehearted support to the
decision.
The objectives which we had In going Into
Korea, and which we still have, Is to preserve the South Korean Republic; to stop
and to punish the aggression against that
Republic; to make clear to all would-be lmperlallsts, as we failed to make clear to
Japanese and Nazi Imperialists In the thirties, that the force or tyranny will be met
by the force or freedom; that there will be no
cheap conquests of the weak by the strong;
that the greater the aggreaslon the greater
wlll be the fearful retribution. By stopping
a local aggression we hope to prevent a general war later; by fighting In Korea now we
hope to save this land of ours from attack
In the future.
When Capt. James Jabara, the leading
pllot of the United Nations In Korea, landed
back In the United States, he waa greeted
first by a reporter from his home town of
Wichita, Kans. The reporter asked: "Why
are we fighting in Korea?" Jabara answered:
"So that we won't have to fight In Wichita."
These are the reasons we are In Korea.
They are fine and decent and sensible reasons. Those who speak disparagingly or
cynically of them prostitute the finest part
of the American Ideal-a willingness to sacrifices now so that our children and our
children's children shall live their liYes In
a better and more satisfying world.
What we did not set out to do In Korea,
what we were not required by any mandate of
the United Nations to do, waa to unify all
of Korea by force. The task of unifying
K::>rea, Is a task for the Korean people themselves with whatever help may be given them
by the United Nations. What we did not
set out to do was to conquer Manchuria.
What we did not set out to do was to carry
Chiang Kai-Shek back to the mainland on
the shield of the United States. What we did
not set out to do was to begin world war III.
We fa!Jed once to distinguish what we
set out to do and what we did not set out
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to do in Korea. I trust that we shall not
f&tl again. Last November, United Nations
forces had scored the remarkable victory
that carried them from practically a beachhead at Pusan back to the thirty-eighth
parallel. At that point we had accomplished
what we had set out to do. We had met
the aggressors, punished them severely, and
all but destroyed their armies. The security
of our forces made It necessary to advance
some distance beyond the thirty-eighth
parallel.
When these forces had reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean peninsula,
some miles so·.tth of the Chinese border, I
urged that we call a halt to the advance and
try to create a buffer zone along the Chinese
Manchurian and Korean frontier. But, apparently, In the mistaken belief that the
Chinese Communists would not enter ·the
war, that we could "end the war by Christmas" our troops were sent probing, in dangerously extended lines, towards the Chinese
border.
The rest is too well known to you to bear
extensive repeating. The Chinese Communists entered the conflict. We suffered a
major defeat. Some of those who just a few
weeks before had been most vociferous In
urging our advance to the Chinese border
now began to pre~s for two alternativeseither the complete abandonment of Korea
or the extension of the war all the way Into
Manchuria and beyond. This "get in or
get out" extremism would have profited no
one but our enemies.
To have abandoned Korea, at that moment,
would have been to sacrifice the very purposes for which we entered the conflict. It
would have meant laying not only all of
Korea but all of the Far East open to new
attacks by Communist Imperialism. To have
extended the war to the Chinese mainland,
on the other hand, would have meant an
involvement-when considered In the light
of the critical situations elsewhere-far beyond our m!l!tary capacity at the time to
support. The latter course could have had
only two outcomes. I! the S:>v!et Union
chose to back the Chinese Communists, It
962236--40018

would have meant the beginning of world
war III. If, on the other hand, the Russians chose to stay out, it would have meant
a unilateral Involvement of this country on
the Chinese mainland.
In the first case we would have had the
very thing which, In our own Interests and
In the Interests of civilization, we are tryIng to prevent. In the second case, we would
have had what General Bradley so aptly
termed "wrong war, wrong place, wrong
time, wrong enemy."
Suppose we gained this cheap and easy
victory over the Chinese Communists which
some seemed to think possible by the use o!
our air and sea power and Chiang's troops.
What would we have gained except the continuing responsibility of trying to keep the
Generalissimo In power In a devastated China
at untold b1111ons of dollars In costs?
And If we did not defeat the Chinese Communists easily, what then? We would do
as we have done In Korea, send Ground Forces
in after sea and air power had failed to bring
an immediate victory. The vast maw or
the Chinese mainland can absorb millions of
ground troops. We could tie up the bulk of
our m1l!tary resources In a secondary arena
of combat, leaving Western Europe--the real
prize-and other vital areas bare to Soviet
conquest. If world war III must come, It
will not be won or lost In south China.
We have to keep our eyes on the objective,
and the place to do this at the present time
Is in Korea. Under General Ridgway's command, the United Nations have once again
returned to a position roughly comparable
to the one held last December. Once again
a moment of decision Is at hand.
It is a moment to restate the alms of our
foreign policy. That policy Is and must continue to be based on the principles of no appeasement and peace-not peace at any price,
but peace as long as it Is humanly and decently and honorably possible to strive tor it.
To achieve that peace we must be prepared
to negotiate, provided the aggressors recognize the error Of their ways and, provided,
the negotiations lead to a settlement that
achieves our purp06es. Appeasemeut and
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negotiation are not the same things. To use
means other than mllltary to achieve reasonable International objectives is ln keeping
with our best traditions. We would do well
to be wary of partisan tongues In this country that are quick to lick the label or appeasement on every nonmilitary action we
take. such tongues could lead our foreign
policy Into rep~ated blind alleys and, ultimately, Into chaos, unnecessary war, or confused retreat.
As to specUlc policy based on these principles ot no appeasement and peace, I believe the tacta of the situation suggest that
the wiseSt course In Korea at this time would
be for the UN forces to remain In the vicinity
of the th1rty-e1ghth parallel so that the
South Korean Republic can be reestablished
1n Ita own right. Beyond that, South Korean
forces should be sent farther northward to
the vicinity of the thirty-ninth parallel so
aa to Increase the defensive strength of
South Korea and to establish a status quo
that can be maintained. In my opinion this
move wlll be a long step toward stopping
Stalin's plans to Involve us ln all-out war
In Asia; It wm allow South Koreans, with
UN help, to start rebuilding their country,
and It wm have accomplished our original
purpose of making clear that aggression
does not pay. South Korea should assume
an Increasingly active role In Ita own defense and we should seek greater military
commitments for Korea from other UN
members with a view to reducing the size
ot the American contingent. The Chinese
may quit Korea In time, but It is necessary,
at this stage to draw our plans as though
they will not. As long aa they continue to
attack, they must be opposed.
Moving south to Japan, present policy calls
tor the signing ot a peace treaty at the
earliest pOSBible time. We are trying to enllst aa many as possible ot the World War
U Allies In this policy. Since the Russians
continue to make Impossible demands as the
price ot participation, we are going ahead
without them. In general, the peace with
Japan which Is planned will be a peace ot
reconcUlatlon, with provision made tor de962236--40018

!ense of the country before the occupation
terminates. ThiS policy must be J:Ushed
with vigor.
With respect to Formosa. we cannot permit It to fall Into the hands o! a Chinese
Ccmmunlst regime which Is ope::ntlng In
the Interests of a fcrelgn power and Is pursulr.g a reckless ccurse of aggreEslon agalns'
the United Nations In Korea. On the other
hand, under present circumstances and at
the present time, I do not believe we ought
to back Chiang Kal-shek In an adventure on
the mainland. Chiang, himself, has Indicated that even with full American assistance, It would take 6 months to make reaay
tor an attack.
It is true that all the Nationalists seek
now Is a little logistical support and some
American technicians for an Invasion of the
mainland. On the surface that seems like
a cheap price to pay tor a diversionary attack
on the Chinese Communists, and some
Americans have been attracted by 1t. It
Is enticing. but It Is also dangerously Illusory. As you probably remember, we began
the Korean conflict by supplying only logistical support to the South Koreans and, In
a year, we have built up our commitment
there to 250,000 men plus extensive sea and
air forces. There may be circumstances In
which the use of Chiang's forces are warranted. These circumstances do not now
exist.
For the present, the National Government
has more than enough problems to keep It
tully occupied on Formosa. It It can do a
thorough overhauling of Itself, perl:}aps some
day the Chinese people may be prepared to
give It another chance on the mainland.
With regard to the Philippines, our policy
in the future must continue to be based
on the Idea of helping the Filipinos fl.nd
their way to stablllty. We will not, as we
did not In 1941, tolerate any attack on these
Islands.
For the rest ot the Far East, our principal
effort must be coordinated with the efforts ot
others ln assisting these countries of southern and southeast Asia to overcome the accumulated Ills of centuries. We must help
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them, as decent neighbors, with little fanfare and within our means, to produce more
food and other nece1111ltles, to Improve the
education of their chUdren, and to eliminate the many health hazards to which they
are exposed-malaria, typhus, cholera, and
other epidemic diseases. Projects of this
kind cost, comparatively, very little money,
but they engender a lasting good will which
muttary action can rarely do. Such projects
also attack some of the baste causes of unrest
and tnatabutty.
The problema which exist In Asia, In Europe, throughout the world, are lmmen~~e.

They are, In the last analysts, the problema
of peace or war, the problema of progresa or
retreat. We cannot eliminate these problems by cloetng our eyes and striking out
blindly at them. Nor can we eliminate them
by denying that they exist. We can meet
them only by striving to understand them;
by closing ranks among ourselves and with
friendly nations the world over and by bringIng to bear on them our united strength
and determination; by reamrmtng, as each
generation must reamrm, that It 111 not In
tyranny but In freedom that mankind flnda
hill destiny.
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